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This paper investigates the demand for and pricing of life insurance when insureds’
risk aversion is correlated with their precautionary eﬀort. We assume that the pop-
ulation is divided into two groups: (i) very risk-averse individuals who have a low
probability of death (PoD) because of the precautionary eﬀort they undertake and (ii)
less risk-averse individuals who undertake less eﬀort and thus have a higher PoD.
After computing the pooling equilibrium price under perfect competition for a class
of CRRA utility and bequest functions, we compute the level of demand for life in-
surance by the two groups. Under the assumption of negative correlation between risk
aversion and risk exposure, lower-risk individuals still buy insurance even if the price
oﬀered is higher than the fair price corresponding to their group. This is because low
risks are assumed to be more risk averse, valuing insurance so highly that they can
tolerate higher than fair prices. We also present some cases when low-risk individuals
purchase more than their high-risk neighbors even though they realize they are subsi-
dizing the high risks. In such cases, the insurers gain the advantage of facing a PoD
which is smaller than the rate they normally expect. This fact contradicts the so-called
adverse selection hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
The study of adverse selection in insurance market originates from Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976). Since their seminal paper, it was usually assumed that insur-
ers had to face adverse selection because of the practical impossibility to separate
high-risk customers from low-risk ones. Customers hide their risk levels from in-
surers and higher-risk individuals always try to take advantage from a favorable
pricing. This conventional theory of adverse selection assumes a positive correla-
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tion between self-perceived risk and real risk and that customers know more about
their riskiness than the insurers and also eﬃciently use their information against
the insurers. Moreover, the theory assumes no relationship between the level of
risk aversion and riskiness. The straightforward consequence of such assumptions
is that the insurers end up with a large proportion of high-risk customers.
However, many of the empirical works from early 90s fail to accept the hypoth-
esis of existence of adverse selection in life insurance markets. Hemenway (1990)
finds that at a hospital in Texas, 41 percent of injured unhelmeted motorcyclists
lacked insurance coverage while only 27 percent of injured helmeted motorcyclists
had no insurance. This suggests that the people who buy insurance are more cau-
tious than the general population.
Cawley and Philipson (1999) in an empirical examination using the U.S. Teach-
ers Insurance and Annuity Data conclude that asymmetric information is not actu-
ally a barrier to trade in the life insurance market, as they couldn’t find enough
evidence on existence of adverse selection in this market. They examined the ef-
fect of indicator variables for self-perceived risk on the quantity of term insurance
and couldn’t find any significant correlation between them. In other words, they
couldn’t find any significant correlation between self-perceived risk, i.e. the in-
dividuals’ beliefs about their riskiness, and the demand for term insurance. This
suggests the misspecification of claims according to which demand increases with
the insureds’ self-perceived expected risk.
Cawley and Philipson also examined the eﬀect of actual risk on the quantity of
life insurance demand and couldn’t find any significant correlation between actual
risk and the demand for life insurance. Surprisingly, they found that the high-risk
individuals hold a lower quantity of insurance, which means negative covariance
between risk exposure and life insurance demand. They also found evidence of
bulk discounts and negative relationship between price and quantity which, indi-
cates that low-risk individuals purchase more life insurance. Otherwise, the in-
surance company will not be able to aﬀord the liabilities of high-risk individuals
with lower premiums. These findings contradict the classical theory of adverse se-
lection. They concluded that this can be due to eﬀective underwriting policy and
the fact that insurers may know their costs of production better than policyholders
and the insurers’ perceived risk rates are more accurate than the rates perceived by
customers.
McCarthy and Mitchell (2003) found that the mortality rates of UK and US
males and females purchasing term- and whole-life insurance are below that of the
uninsureds. For example, they found that mortality rate for male purchasers of
whole-life insurance is only 77.6 and 78.6 percent of the total population mortality
rate for the UK and the US, respectively.
Meza and Webb (2001) state that in addition to precautionary eﬀort that ex-
plains the negative relationship between insurance demand and risk level, hetero-
geneous optimism also supports this negative correlation: High risks are more op-
timistic about the events to be improbable, so they purchase less insurance.
Siegelman (2004) claims that the informational asymmetries are in the favor
When Eﬀort Rimes with Advantageous Selection: A New Approach to Life Insurance Pricing 3
of insurers, not insureds as insurers utilize various strategies of underwritings and
risk classifications that compensate for or even overcome whatever informational
advantage policyholders might have. Another possibility is that a “behavioral or
psychological” factor, which is the negative correlation between customers’ risk
aversion and their risk exposure, benefits the insurers to gain an advantage. Higher
risk aversion means a willingness to pay more to eliminate risk. In other words, a
more risk-averse individual tolerates a higher premium than someone who is less
risk averse. If it is assumed that the low-risk individuals are also suﬃciently risk-
averse, they will value insurance so highly that it will be worthwhile for them to
buy it even at a price higher than their actuarial fair rates. Under such assumption,
insurers do not face adverse selection especially when we assume that the more
risk-averse individuals, who value insurance excessively, undertake more precau-
tionary eﬀorts.
In the next section we develop a model to find the demand levels for two groups
of diﬀerent risk levels and the optimal pooling price under perfect competition. In
section 3, we examine the parameters that are crucial in switching the regime to ad-
vantageous selection. Section 4 discusses the occurrence of favorable situations for
insurers when PoD is considered as a decreasing function of risk aversion. Section
5 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. The Demand Function
The population is assumed to be divided into two groups: A group of low-risk
individuals L who are assumed to be very risk averse with the probability of death
pL lower than average, and a group of high-risk individuals H who are assumed
to be less risk-averse people whose probability of death pH will be higher than
average. For simplicity, we assume that each group consists of the same number
of perfectly identical people (same initial wealth, income, probability of death and
risk aversion for all members of each group). The lower probability of death of
the more risk-averse group can be explained by a higher frequency of visits to a
doctor, the absence of engagement in activities reputed life-threatening or danger-
ous, like smoking or driving a motorbike, and in general by taking any eﬀorts that
may contribute to improving the life expectancy of individuals. We will denote by
ei, i ∈ {L,H} the eﬀort made by each group, and by Ui and Vi, i ∈ {L,H}, the util-
ity and bequest functions of each group. When we need an explicit expression for
these two functions, we will assume that for each i ∈ {L,H}, Ui and Vi are identical
CRRA utility functions with parameter αi ∈ ]0, 1[
∀i ∈ {L,H} , ∀X ∈ R+, Ui(X) = Vi(X) = X1−αi . (1)
Eﬀort levels are assumed to be a characteristic of individuals and cannot be ad-
justed. For simplicity here we consider only two groups, but we may want to con-
sider in a more general way that the probability of death p = p(e) is a decreasing
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function of the eﬀort e and that the risk aversion parameter α = α(e) is an increasing
function of the eﬀort e.
If we sum up all constraints relative to the parameters we just introduced, we
have
eH < eL,
0 < pL < pH < 1,
and 0 < αH < αL < 1.
Of course, insurance companies are assumed to be unable to sort customers
between the two groups and consequently will only oﬀer one type of contract to
all. The contract may be purchased in quantities subject to constraints relative to
wealth and income. Each contract unit represents a potential endowment of $1 and
is sold at a unit premium q.
We are interested in computing the demand levelsxi(q), i ∈ {L,H}, for the two
groups of people depending on the price q of one contract unit. Each group of




EUi(ei, q,Wi,Yi) = (1 − pi)Ui(Wi + Yi − qxi) + piVi(Wi + xi), (2)
subject to the constraints
xi ≥ 0, (3)
xiq ≤ Yi, (4)
and xi ≤ Yi, (5)
where Wi and Yi, i ∈ {L,H} are respectively the initial wealth and expected
income of the corresponding group . Here we assume that insurance premium is
charged no later than the time of death. Condition (3) represents the fact that indi-
viduals cannot sell insurance on their own life. Condition (4) states that individuals
are not willing to pay more than their expected income in premiums, and condition
(5) states that insurers won’t allow customers to cover more than the maximum
possible incurred loss. The premium q should always be smaller than 1 and thus
condition (4) is always satisfied when (5) is satisfied.
Assuming CRRA utility and bequest functions (1), the first order condition for
Problem (2) can be written
−(1 − pi)(Wi + Yi − qxi)−αi q + pi(Wi + xi)−αi(1 − q) = 0, (6)
which gives us the optimal demand as
x∗i (q) =
(Wi + Yi)Ki(q) −Wi
qKi(q) + 1
, (7)









For now, we do not consider whether the constraints (3)-(5) are satisfied or not. We
simply notice that the demand in equation (7) might be negative if Ki(q) is positive
(always true) and suﬃciently small.
2.2. Unit Contract Premium under Perfect Competition
Insurers cannot distinguish which potential customers belong to which group,
but they are assumed to have a perfect knowledge of the global characteristics of
the two groups.






[(1 − pi)q − pi(C + 1)]x∗i (q), (8)
whereC is the processing cost of claim per contract unit. Under perfect compe-
tition, the company with the cheapest processing cost gets the whole of the market,
at a price q that is so that the other companies would make an infinitesimal loss.
Here we consider that, under perfect competition, all companies in the market have




[(1 − pi)q∗ − pi(C + 1)]x∗i (q∗) = 0. (9)
Figure 1 Profit of insurer when the parameters of two groups are as follows: WH = WL = 0, YH =
YL = 100, pH = 0.02, αH = 0.3, pL = 0.01, αL = 0.8. The cost of processing C = 0.2 induces a pooling
equilibrium price of q∗ = 0.0207. The corresponding optimal demands are obtained as x∗L(q) = 40.44
and x∗H(q) = 93.53, which satisfy the conditions (3)–(5).
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Inserting the optimal group demands found in (7), and after simplification,
equation (9) will become
[(1 − pL)q∗ − pL(C + 1)][(WL + YL)KL(q∗) −WL](q∗KH(q∗) + 1)
+[(1 − pH)q∗ − pH(C + 1)][(WH + YH)KH(q∗) −WH](q∗KL(q∗) + 1) = 0. (10)
This is a complex function with non-integer powers of q∗, but we can find the zeros
numerically. See Figure 1 for an example of solving equation (10) graphically.
3. What Parameters Are Crucial to Determine whether There Is
Advantageous Selection?
3.1. Evolution of Price and Demands when Processing Cost Is Considered as
an Endogenous Factor
Here the expression “endogenous factor” is used to simply mean that we will
draw the evolution of price and demands as functions of the processing cost. It
does not mean that the modeling assumptions are changed; processing cost is still
considered as a fixed parameter that insurers and insureds cannot change at will.
Every point of the curve will represent a diﬀerent system. We are interested in
determining whether advantageous selection may occur naturally in this setting for
some parameter values or not.
To check the eﬀect of processing cost on switching the regime from adverse
selection to advantageous selection, we have plotted the optimal demand levels
for both groups as well as the corresponding optimal pooling equilibrium price
for 1000 units of insurance. In graph (a) of the Figure 2 parameters are equal to
those used in the previous section except the processing cost which is independent
variable (endogenous factor) here, changes from 0 to 1.
For each graph, all parameters are assumed to be fixed. From graph (a) to
(d), the risk aversion level of low risks increases (0.8, 0.9, 0.95, and 0.98 from
graph (a) to (d), respectively) while the risk aversion level of high risks decreases
successively (0.3, 0.2, 0.1, and 0.05 from graph (a) to (d), respectively). Actually
we increased the gap between the risk aversions to increase the sensitivity to risk
of low-risk individuals compared to the more risky individuals.
All four graphs show that increasing the processing cost tends to change the
regime from adverse selection to advantageous selection as the demand of low risks
exceeds that of the high risks when C is suﬃciently large, given other factors.
This result is logical since the low-risk individuals -who are assumed to be more
risk averse- can tolerate higher levels of prices, so they do not drop out of the
market easily and continue purchasing the product, while their less risk-averse risky
neighbors drop out of the market faster when prices increase as a result of any
increase in processing costs.
As we increase the gap between CRRA of two groups from graph (a) to (d),
the switch occurs in a smaller level of processing cost. Consequently, any increase
in the relative risk aversion of the low-risk group also tends to create a favorable
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Figure 2 Demands and price when C is considered as an endogenous factor.
(a) WH = WL = 0, YH = YL = 100, pH = 0.02, αH = 0.3pL = 0.01, αL = 0.8.
(b) The same as (a) except risk aversions change to: αH = 0.2, αL = 0.9.
(c) The same as (a) except risk aversions change to: αH = 0.1, αL = 0.95.
(d) The same as (a) except risk aversions change to: αH = 0.05, αL = 0.98.
There are two conclusions: (i) In each graph when C increases, the regime tends to change to advan-
tageous selection. (ii) When the gap between relative risk aversions increases, the critical value of C
above which the regime switches to advantageous selection decreases. Note that, here, all demand levels
above 100 violate constraint (5), so the solution to the constrained problem would be diﬀerent in these
cases.
situation for insurers. We will discuss this fact in the next section by letting risk
aversion change as an endogenous factor while other factors are kept constant.
3.2. Evolution of Price and Demands when Risk Aversion of Low Risks Is
Considered as an Endogenous Factor
In this section we discuss how risk aversion aﬀects the changing of the regime
to advantageous selection. In Figure 3 we have plotted the optimal demand levels
and corresponding price for 1000 units of insurance when αL varies from 0 to 1.
The parameters in graph (a) of the figure are the same as the original numerical
example except that the risk aversion of low-risk group is varying from 0 to 1. Even
though the demand of high-risk group exceeds that of the low risks everywhere in
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Figure 3 Demands and price when αL is considered as an endogenous factor:
(a) WH = WL = 0, YH = YL = 100, pH = 0.02, αH = 0.3, pL = 0.01 and C = 0.2.
(b) The same as (a) except processing cost changes to 0.6.
(c) The same as (b) except processing cost increases to 0.9.
(d) The same as (c) except pH is decreased to 0.015.
In figure (a) even though adverse selection exists for all ranges of αL, the gap between demand levels
is getting smoother when αL increases. When C increases to 0.6 in graph (b), the gap declines further.
Graph (c) shows that for C = 0.9, two demand curves intersect at αL = 0.899, indicating a switch of
regime to advantageous selection. When the diﬀerence between PoDs decreases as shown in graph (d),
the switch to advantageous selection regime occurs for a smaller αL.
Figure 3 supports the idea that the increase in C has positive eﬀect on changing the regime to advan-
tageous selection. The figure also supports the mentioned result that when the relative risk aversion
of low-risk group is increased, the regime tends to change to advantageous selection. Moreover, the
decrease of PoD of high-risk group tends to have positive eﬀect on creating a favorable situation for
insurers.
the range, the gap between demands declines smoothly as we move to the right-
hand side of the graph. In graph (b), we just increased the fixed amount of C from
0.2 to 0.6 and observe that this gap is getting narrower. In graph (c) we increased
C from 0.6 to 0.9 exogenously. The demand functions now intersect at αL = 0.899
indicating the demand level of low risks exceeds that of the high-risk group from
this point, creating propitious condition for insurers.
The last graph (d) is attributed to the lower level of the gap between PoDs, while
When Eﬀort Rimes with Advantageous Selection: A New Approach to Life Insurance Pricing 9
other parameters are kept given as in (c). Here we observe the regime change for a
lower level ofαL. The results mentioned in the previous section are reinforced here;
Figure 3 supports the idea that any increase in processing cost or the relative risk
aversion of low-risk individuals tends to create a favorable situation for insurers.
Moreover, Figure 3 (d) suggests that the decrease of PoD of the high-risk group
tends to have a positive eﬀect on creating this favorable situation.
4. The Selection Effect when PoD Is Considered as a Decreasing
Linear Function of Risk Aversion
It is obvious that more risk-averse individuals usually exert higher level of pre-
cautionary eﬀorts and thus have lower PoD. As a result, PoD can be assumed as
a negative function of risk aversion indicating higher levels of PoDs are attributed
to lower levels of risk aversion. For simplicity and logical consideration, we apply
this assumption to only low risks that are more sensitive to risks. Figure 4 shows
the eﬀects of this assumption on the optimal demands and optimal price. In graph
(a) of this figure, we assume the PoD of low risks pL to be a decreasing aﬃne func-
tion of the risk aversion αL so that the line passes through the points (αL, pL) = (0.3,
0.02) and (αL, pL) = (0.8, 0.01). We see that the two demand curves cross at αL =
0.3 as we expect, since risk aversions and PoDs are identical for the two groups at
this point. The other intersection is at αL = 0.109. At these two points the optimal
demands of the two groups are equal, the insurers’ perceived mortality rate will be
equal to the real mortality rate of the insureds and hence no information asymmetry
occurs.
We can distinguish 3 cases in Figure 4 (a):
1. When 0.3 < αL < 1 , the more risky group of H demands more and therefore
the so-called adverse selection regime prevails in the market.
2. When 0.109 < αL < 0.3, even though xL exceeds xH , this is still a case of
adverse selection since previously called “low risks” with the demand level of
xL are more risky now as their risk aversion is smaller than the risk aversion
for the group which was previously called “high risks” with the demand level
ofxH .
3. The only section where advantageous selection can be observed is the ex-
treme left where 0 < αL < 0.109 as the currently less risky group whose
demand is shown by xH purchases more than the currently more risky group
here with the demand level ofxL. In this portion, pL > pH = 0.02 and
αL < αH = 0.3. We see that when the processing cost is relatively small,
higher PoDs together with lower risk-aversion levels lead to advantageous
selection regime.
In graph (b), the processing cost C is increased from 0.2 to 0.9, and the CRRA
of high risks is decreased from 0.3 to 0.1. The result of such changes is satisfactory:
The market faces advantageous selection for the range αL > 0.1.
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Figure 4 Demands, pL and price when pL is a decreasing linear function of αL:
(a) WH = WL = 0, YH = YL = 100, pH = 0.02, αH = 0.3,C = 0.2 and pL passes through the points
(0.3,0.02) and (0.8,0.01).
(b) The same as (a) except C is increased to 0.9 and αH is decreased to 0.1. Now, pL passes through
the points (0.1, 0.02) and (0.8, 0.01). In graph (a), the insurer faces advantageous selection only in the
leftmost portion where 0 < αL < 0.109.
In graph (b), the insurer faces advantageous selection for the wide range of αL > 0.1. The increase in
processing cost C and the relative risk aversion of low-risk individuals create a favorable situation for
insurer.
5. Conclusions
The conventional theory of insurance demand under asymmetric information
ignores the eﬀect of negative correlation between risk aversion and risk exposure
and also the eﬀect of precautionary eﬀorts on the probability of loss. The alternative
advantageous selection theory assumes a negative correlation between risk aversion
and risk exposure and indicates that more risk-averse individuals not only undertake
more precautionary eﬀorts to avoid loss but also are more inclined to insure. The
implication of this alternative theory is that the insurers end up with relatively good-
risk individuals and the market oﬀers suﬃcient provision of insurance.
We could graphically present some cases when good risks are better oﬀ with
pooling equilibrium rather than dropping out of the insurance pool. Since negative
correlation between risk aversion and risk exposure makes the market plausible for
good risks, they prefer to continue purchasing life insurance policy even though the
price is not fair to them and they are actually subsidizing the high-risk policyhold-
ers.
Processing cost and risk aversion level have meaningful eﬀect on changing the
regime: For the model with processing cost as endogenous factor, when the gap
between CRRA of two groups is increased, the critical value of processing cost that
changes the regime to advantageous selection, decreases. Moreover, for the model
with risk aversion level of low risks as endogenous factor, when the processing cost
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increases, the regime changes to advantageous selection for a lower level of risk
aversion for low risks. Briefly speaking, with a higher gap between risk aversions,
less processing cost is required to create advantageous selection regime and vice
versa.
In this model, it is predicted that increasing processing cost alters the regime
from adverse selection to advantageous selection since low-risk individuals who are
more risk averse, can tolerate higher deductibles and prices and keep buying insur-
ance in the market, while less risk-averse high-risk individuals can tolerate lower
levels of deductibles and prices and drop out of the market. So, the market ends up
with relatively more risk-averse low-risk individuals, which means switching the
regime to a situation of advantageous selection.
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